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Constitutional Law
The Supreme Court (Offices) Act 1997: Loss of a constitutional 
safeguard
by Professor G Ganz
The Act which received the Royal 
Assent on 17 December 1997 has hardly 
been headline news, though attention has 
been drawn in The Guardian to its 
constitutional significance (Hugo Young, 
The Guardian, 18 December 1997).
The Bill consisted of one clause, which 
removed the restriction that the 
Permanent Secretary of the Lord 
Chancellor's department must be a 
barrister or solicitor of ten years' 
standing (Supreme Court Act 1981 ('SCA'), 
s. 88 and sch. 2), or a non-lawyer with at 
least five years experience in the 
Department (added by the Courts and 
Legal Services Act 1990, s. 71(2) and sch. 
10). The new clause also removed the 
provisions on tenure and the special 
retirement age of 72 for the post in SCA, 
s. 92.
The justification for the change is that 
the restriction limited the availability of 
candidates for a department which now 
employs 11,000 staff and has a budget of 
£2 billion (4 HC Deb vol. 300, col. 407 
6 November 1997   Second Reading 
debate). The Lord Chancellor claimed 
that there was only one official in the 
department with the requisite experience 
to be Permanent Secretary who met the 
statutory criteria, and that in the whole 
Civil Service only one other candidate 
had been identified who was eligible (HL 
Deb vol. 583, col. 933, 25 November 
1997   Second Reading debate).
The present Permanent Secretary (Sir 
Thomas Legg KCB, QC, who joined the 
department in 1962 and has been 
Permanent Secretary since 1989) is due 
to retire in April 1998 and the Lord 
Chancellor explained that the Bill had to 
have passed through the House of 
Commons before the selection process 
could begin, free from the statutory 
restrictions (HL Deb vol. 583, col. 937, 
25 November 1997   Second Reading 
debate). As this needed to start by the 
end of 1997, the Bill had to be 
introduced in the House of Commons, 
even though the House of Lords would 
have been more appropriate.
THE BILL'S PROGRESS
The Bill was passed through all its 
stages in the Commons in one day in 3 %
o J
hours with the reluctant acquiescence of 
the Opposition (HL Deb vol. 300, col. 
437, 6 November 1997 - Second 
Reading debate). The Bill was sent to a 
committee of the Whole House but as 
the Deputy Speaker refused to accept 
manuscript amendments the only debate 
that took place was on a motion that the 
clause stand part of the Bill. In the House 
of Lords there was a one-hour debate on 
Second Reading (HL Deb vol. 583, col. 
932946, 6 November 1997 - Second 
Reading debate) and as there were noO '
amendments the subsequent stages were 
purely formal (HL Deb vol. 584, col. 12, 
9 December, 1997 and col. 503, 16 
December 1997). In that short debate, 
serious reservations were raised by Lord 
Woolf, the Master of the Rolls, and Lord 
Ackner, a retired Law Lord (HL Deb vol. 
583, col. 937 and 939, 25 November 
1997   Second Reading debate). It was 
the Lord Chancellor's constitutional 
position, as the guardian of the 
independence of the judiciary, that they 
felt might be deleteriously affected if 
the Permanent Secretary did not have 
the appropriate experience and 
qualifications.
THE KEY ISSUE
As was made clear in the House of 
Commons debate by the Opposition, the 
key issue is the pivotal role played by the 
Permanent Secretary in judicial 
appointments made by the Lord 
Chancellor. The 'soundings' or 
consultations, which precede such 
appointments, are carried out by the 
Judicial Appointments Group in the 
department whose head is directly 
responsible to the Permanent Secretary 
(HC 52 (1995-96) vol. 2, Evidence 
p. 155, Third Report from the Home Affairs 
Committee, 'Judicial Appointments 
Procedures'). These two men almost 
always conduct the soundings for the 
High Court Bench bv meeting the senior
o ^ o
judges one-to-one (Third Report,
q. 43 45). The Opposition tried 
unsuccessfully to meet the government 
halfway by suggesting that:
'... the Lord Chancellor should have at his 
right hand somebody with deep and practical 
experience of the workings of the department, 
who has experience of close co-ordination with 
the legal system generally, and the legal 
profession and the courts in particular' (HL 
Deb vol. 300, col. 443, 6 November 
1997   Second Reading debate, Sir 
Nicholas Lyell).
This aim was not met by the Lord 
Chancellor's assurance that the Legal 
Adviser to the Lord Chancellor answers 
directly to the Permanent Secretary, as do 
other group heads, most of whom are 
qualified lawyers and have lengthy 
experience in the department (HL Deb 
vol. 583, col. 936, 25 November 1997 - 
Second Reading debate).
EVEN THE TEA BOY...
At the time of the introduction of the 
possibility that the Permanent Secretary of 
the Lord Chancellor's department could he a 
non-lawyer with at least five years experience 
in the Department (Court.? and Leyal Services 
Act 1990, s. 71(2) and sch. 10), Lord Ackner 
commented, 'I imagine that includes the tea 
boy upwards'. (HL Deb Vol. 515, col. 631, 
February 5 1990).
It is the Permanent Secretary who at 
present stands at the apex of the pyramid 
and plays the pivotal role in gathering and 
co-ordinating information and advice for 
judicial appointments. If he can no 
longer be relied on to act as a 
constitutional safeguard of judicial 
independence, a more formal separation 
of powers may become necessary and an 
independent commission entrusted with 
the appointment of judges (HL Deb vol. 
583, col. 941, 25 November 1997 - 
Second Reading debate, Lord Hooson). 
This was rejected by the Home Affairs 
Committee, HC 52 (1995-96) but was 
Labour Party' policy before the General 
Election in 1997. ©
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An introduction to digital signatures
by Edward Cheng
W ith its wealth of electronic information, the Global Information Infrastructure (Gil) has the potential to improve services, create new markets and 
increase overall efficiency. Using the Gil, doctors can share 
opinions and information with medical professionals across the 
country, enhancing the care that they provide. Some 
government agencies now accept applications and contract bids 
in electronic form, reducing needless mountains of paperwork 
(as an example, the application for the US National Science 
Foundation scholarship is almost completely on-line). Industry 
even speculates about widespread electronic commerce in which 
the public will make transactional purchases on-line. However, 
all of these promising developments will require the electronic 
equivalent of a signature that performs two primary functions 
(in addition to confidentiality, requiring cryptographic 
solutions).
  Authenticating the identity of the message sender. Like conventional 
signatures, electronic ones must prove identity. For example, 
doctors in New York receiving advice from specialists in 
London need to verify that their colleagues (and not some 
hacker) sent the message.
  Ensuring the integrity of the message. Paper documents are 
somewhat difficult to alter because of their physical 
embodiment. In contrast, digital information can be changed 
without evidence of tampering, making integrity verification 
critical. For example, stockbrokers need to ensure that 
transaction orders are neither altered not damaged in transit,o 7
since $1,000 can easily become $10,000.
BACKGROUND READING
For background information on the operation of digital signatures, 
reader should consult the works of Daniel Greenwood, Wyrough, 
Bradford Biddle, A Michael Froomkin or any basic cryptography 
primer.
ESTABLISHING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Fortunately, digital signatures using public-key cryptography 
techniques can achieve the two requirements above. From a 
technical standpoint, digital signatures can prevent a person 
from falsely claiming that they never sent the message or that the 
message was altered, a quality called non-repudiation (Charles 
Merrill, 'An Attorney's Roadmap to the Digital Signature 
Guidelines' Electronic Banking and Law Report, September 1996, 
p. 13). However, technical non-repudiation does not 
automatically translate into legal non-repudiation. If a person 
uses a digital signature to sign an electronic agreement, it is not 
necessarily legally binding or enforceable. The law must first 
recognise the validity of digital signatures, and then it must 
provide a framework defining the relationships among the 
various parties (signer, recipient, third parties, etc.). A legal 
framework will allow judicial systems to uniformly and 
appropriately attribute liability and accountability.
LEGISLATE EXPEDIENTLY BUT 
CAUTIOUSLY
Industry and the public will be reluctant to develop electronic 
commerce under a cloud of legal certainty. Without a proper 
legal framework, parties will be exposed to unknown and 
potentially undesirable risks, discouraging their participation. 
For example, if a hacker forges a person's digital signature, to 
that extent they are liable (A Michael Froomkin, 'The Essential 
Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce', Oregon 
Law Review 49, 1996). Governments should act swiftly to create 
the policies and laws required by digital signatures. Case law 
should play a role, but its development is typically inconsistent, 
expensive and slow, providing little solace to parties wishing to 
assess their risk and liability. As a minimum, legislators should 
develop basic principles to direct and channel the judiciary, who 
will then flesh out the specifics.
However, as expressed by the UK's Department of Trade and 
Industry:
'These are complex issues and cannot be rushed. Such changes [in 
law] will help to underpin secure electronic commerce Jor a long time to 
come. We cannot afford to get it wrong.' flan Taylor, Licensing of 
Trusted Third Parties Jor the Provision of Encryption Services, 
http://www.steptoe.com/ukpub.htm).
Digital signatures are still an emerging technology and have 
not yet found widespread use. Thus, governments still have time 
to form task forces, issue draft legislation, hear testimony and 
carefully deliberate policy. However, ultimately, they should 
solidify the digital signature law through legislation, reassuring 
industry and promoting electronic commerce.
RECENT INITIATIVES
A number of US states, including Utah, California, Florida,
' O ' '
Georgia and Massachusetts, have passed or are currently 
considering digital signature legislation 'to facilitate commerce 
by means of reliable electronic messages' (The Utah Digital 
Signature Act, cited by C Bradford Biddle, 'Misplaced Priorities: 
The Utah Digital Signature Act and Liability Allocation in a 
Public Key infrastructure', San Diego Law Review 33, November 
1966). However in cyberspace these nuances are unacceptable. 
Policymakers cannot reasonably expect consumers to track their 
relevant jurisdiction on the Web and then determine the 
applicable laws. Even if Gil users tried jurisdiction in cyberspace 
is often ambiguous and undefined. Consequently, businesses and 
their customers will grow frustrated worrying about potential 
but unknown laws, obligations and liabilities.
CO-ORDINATED EFFORTS
Whether through the UN, World Trade Organization (WTO) 
or some other international body, governments should attempt 
to adopt uniform digital signature laws uniformly, as required by 
electronic commerce. This organization should review two 
avenues for co-ordinating digital signature legislation:
(i) endorsing an existing national, US state or model law and
